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THE
ANTHROPOLOGICAL REVIEW.

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PHILOSOPHY AND PSEUDO-PHILOSOPHY.*

“DOES science undermine religious faith?” asks Dr. Doherty. “Not at all,” he answers; “but in the name of science atheistic philosophy attacks religion. And why is this? Because natural science deals mainly with the laws of material forces and phenomena, while religion deals mainly with spiritual forces and phenomena. Science deals with the visible universe alone; religion with the unseen world. The cosmic universe is double, natural, and supernatural; and those who study the natural half exclusively cannot discover a true philosophy. Man’s destiny is double, natural, and supernatural. His life in this world is a preparation for a future life; and whoever denies this fundamental proposition can have no adequate idea of religion.”

The above passage merits the most careful consideration; we do not remember that we ever met with so curious a psychological and anthropological study. We might be tempted to say, that an entirely new phase of the human intellect has here been manifested to us; but as we have never made a special study either of the Irish character or of mental pathology in Ireland, we must content ourselves with the remark that to us Dr. Doherty’s views and arguments appear to be thoroughly original. This is not the first time we have met with word-worship, but we cannot remember that we ever saw it carried so far as it has been carried by Dr. Doherty. We cannot remember that we were ever before requested *totidem verbis* to believe in the spiritual *phenomena* of the *unseen* world. The worship of the

* “Philosophy of Religion”, by Hugh Doherty, M.D. Trübner: 1865. “Lilly’s Astrology”, by Zadkiel. Bohn: 1852. “Buddhism in Tibet”, by Emil Schlagintweit, LL.D. Trübner: 1863. “First Principles”, by Herbert Spencer; Part I, The Unknowable. Williams and Norgate: 1862.

Bull was taught in former times by the Egyptians; it is said that Olympian Jove once transformed himself into a bull, and so won the affections of Europa. If Dr. Doherty has similar designs, we very much fear that he will not be equally successful; Europa has recently been to school, and learned a few things of which she was ignorant in the days of Jupiter; her sisters, too, are all promising damsels, quite capable of recognising a bull's foot when they see it. But if Jupiter's bovine mode of courtship is to be adopted, we should recommend Dr. Doherty to devote himself to Africa, the much-toasted *brunette*.

If it be true, as Dr. Doherty implies, that religion will be subjected to the attacks of that which he is pleased to call "atheistic philosophy," until science studies the phenomena of the unseen together with the phenomena of the seen, it is probable that religion will have a rather unquiet life for some little time to come. But we differ entirely from Dr. Doherty; we cannot admit his premises. If we remember rightly, it has generally been religion which has attacked science, not science which has attacked religion. Science pursues her way calmly and steadily; and if she is sometimes forced to turn and strike her enemies, she does so with reluctance, for to her at least time is precious; and time spent in a battle in which she has nothing to gain, though religion may have much to lose, is to science time utterly wasted. As it has always been, so it is now. As the infallible Church forced itself into Galileo's investigations, so the infallible Dr. Doherty and other dogmatists force themselves into the science of anthropology. "Man's nature is double, natural and supernatural;" if this is meant to be a scientific statement, let us have some of the "phenomena of the supernatural" given in evidence; if it is meant to be a religious dogma, it wants that novelty which is to be found elsewhere in Dr. Doherty's book.

Novelties there are of all kinds. Dr. Doherty's theory of causation is beyond the grasp of ordinary minds. In the passage above quoted, we are told that "atheistic philosophy attacks religion because natural science deals mainly with the laws of material force and phenomena, while religion deals mainly with spiritual forces and phenomena." On the same principle astronomy ought to attack botany, the birds ought to wage war against the fishes, and some star which no telescope has ever yet discovered ought to run a-muck against the solar system. Science and religion are as distinct as any two things can be; and atheism is a much closer ally of religion than of science. Science is just as antagonistic to atheism as she is to religion, and the antagonism is in each case only an antagonism of method. Religion and atheism both depend upon dogmas. Science is founded upon

facts. The theist says "there *is* a God;" the atheist says "there is *not* a God;" the man of science, in his capacity of man of science, says "the question does not concern me; I have no evidence." But if religion will mistake her vocation, and force what she holds to be evidence in her favour upon the notice of the man of science, she invariably calls the refutation of that evidence an attack. Let her but keep within her own domain, and science cannot touch her. Let her but take up the high *à priori* ground, and, although she may possibly be starved out, she can never have her position taken by assault.

The consideration of this point leads us to say a few words upon the view taken by Mr. Herbert Spencer, who, while allowing that we cannot know the nature of the reality which underlies appearances, considers that we have some evidence for the positive existence of that reality. It is, in our opinion, unjust to accuse Mr. Spencer of atheism, as Dr. Doherty does by implication. If Mr. Spencer has erred, he has erred in the opposite direction. He has endeavoured to show that there is a foundation for all religious beliefs, that science herself tells us of an incomprehensible something, which religion bids us to worship; and so he reconciles religion and science. We cannot here analyse at length the argument by which this conclusion is arrived at, but, if we are not mistaken, it is arrived at by the aid of a very old fallacy in a somewhat new form. It seems to us that Mr. Spencer has reproduced something very like the old doctrine of the realists, and arrived through it at the positive existence of the incomprehensible.

The most important part of Mr. Spencer's argument is that in which he treats of "the relativity of all knowledge," and which he thus sums up: "We have seen how in the very assertion that all our knowledge, properly so called, is Relative, there is involved the assertion that there exists a Non-relative. We have seen how, in each step of the argument by which this doctrine is established, the same assumption is made. We have seen how, from the very necessity of thinking in relations, it follows that the Relative is itself inconceivable, except as related to a real Non-relative. We have seen that unless a real Non-relative or Absolute be postulated, the Relative itself becomes absolute, and so brings the argument to a contradiction. And on contemplating the process of thought, we have equally seen how impossible it is to get rid of the consciousness of an actuality lying behind appearances; and how, from this impossibility, results our indestructible belief in that actuality."

Throughout the whole of the above summary it will be observed that "the Relative" is spoken of as an entity, as something which actually exists. Nor is this merely a loose or careless mode of ex-

pression; the existence of "the Non-relative" is inferred from the existence of "the Relative." But precisely as Mr. Spencer argues, "destroy the existence of the Non-relative or Absolute, and you destroy the existence of the Relative," we may argue, "destroy the existence of the Relative, and you destroy the existence of the Non-relative or Absolute." It seems almost incredible that Mr. Spencer, who has elsewhere shown himself thoroughly alive to the danger of mistaking words for things, should have argued as though "the Relative" were an apparent something, the existence of which is self-evident. "The Relative" is simply the most general term at which we have arrived—probably the most general at which we can ever arrive; but when we endeavour to interpret—to realise to ourselves the meaning—of the term, we think only of objects which are in relation to one another. We have no idea of "the Relative," except as a symbol. Were "the Relative" more than a symbol, it is true that the fundamental law of the mind would compel us to admit also a non-relative, for without discrimination there is no thought. But when "the relative" is thought of, this law of discrimination operates not by suggesting a non-relative, but by translating the abstract into the concrete. The mind can never grasp the abstract, can never realise the meaning of the abstract, but by the aid of the concrete; as soon as it attempts to realise the meaning of "the Relative," it thinks of two or more objects in relation one to another, and so fulfils the fundamental law.

Mr. Spencer has, we think, carried the scientific sin of word-worship still further in the following passage: "Observe, in the first place, that every one of the arguments by which the relativity of our knowledge is demonstrated, distinctly postulates the positive existence of something beyond the relative. To say that we cannot know the Absolute, is, by implication to affirm that there *is* an Absolute. In the very denial of our power to learn *what* the Absolute is, there lies hidden the assumption *that* it is; and the making of this assumption proves that the Absolute has been present to the mind, not as a nothing but as a something."

Surely if we were to say "it is impossible to discover what are the characteristics of the human beings inhabiting the planet Jupiter, or the extent of the fire which rages beneath the Atlantic," we should not have done much to prove either that Jupiter is inhabited, or that there is a fire beneath the Atlantic.

In short, we think, that with all his ingenuity and subtlety, Mr. Spencer has done no more than even Dr. Doherty to demonstrate the existence of the Absolute. The difference between the two writers is enormous; Dr. Doherty is always dogmatising, Mr. Spencer is always trying to demonstrate; but extremes meet, and the fallacy, which, we

believe, vitiates Mr. Spencer's arguments, bears a very strong resemblance to the fallacies of Dr. Doherty's pamphlet.

In curious contrast to Mr. Spencer's belief in a "something," is the Mahāyāna doctrine. "The fundamental dogma," says Dr. Emil Schlagintweit, "is that of the emptiness or nothingness of things." Dr. Schlagintweit further tells us that there exists "an interesting treatise on nothingness, called the Vajramandā Dhāraṇī, which contains a *résumé* of the ideas connected with this dogma." It seems, however, that nothingness pure and simple did not prove so interesting to the professors of the Mahāyāna faith as to Dr. Schlagintweit, for the most important dogma set up by the Contemplative Mahāyāna school "is decidedly the personification of the voidness, by supposing that a soul, Alaya, is the basis of every thing. This soul exists from time immemorial, and in every object; 'it reflects itself in every thing, like the moon in clear and tranquil water.'"

The personification of nothingness is almost worthy of Dr. Doherty; the simile is quite worthy of him; the confusion of ideas is not to be surpassed. That which is the basis of everything is reflected in everything, and when so reflected is like the moon in clear water,—from which it may be inferred, as it seems to us, that the moon must be the basis of clear water, and that it is like nothingness because only the reflection of the moon is to be discovered in the water, while nothingness itself is to be discovered there and elsewhere.

But the growth of something out of nothing seems to be easy under certain circumstances; dogmas have a vivifying influence to which nothing else can be compared: "the dogma once established that an absolute, pure, nature exists, Buddhism soon proceeded in the mystical school further to endow it with the character of an all-embracing deity. Japanese Buddhism also speaks of a supreme Buddha, who sits throned in the diamond world, and has created all the Buddhas."

We remarked in a previous portion of this review that atheism is a much nearer ally of theism than of science, because the origin of the two is similar. We see from the above passages how the dogmatic assertion that nothingness is the foundation of all things has passed by successive modifications into the assertion that something like a human being presides over all things. This is neither more nor less than the transition from atheism to anthropomorphic theism—no small evidence *à posteriori* that the two are very closely connected.

The direction of transition is, however, usually reversed; the change is usually from theism to atheism rather than from atheism to theism. Atheism, in modern times at least, is usually a revolt from received dogmas; but the dogmatic habit of mind, acquired in early

years, asserts itself in a new form, and we regret that it disfigures the works of a most distinguished foreign anthropologist. Above all things, let anthropology avoid the deadly scientific sin of dogmatism; dogmatism cannot possibly do any good; the amount of harm which it may do is incalculable. When once a dogma has come into existence, it is the most prolific of all things; it is constantly going about, having promiscuous intercourse with all kinds of other dogmas, and begetting a progeny of which it is often impossible to discover the real parentage. A dogma, in short, is the very *bête noire* of scientific morality.

The Mahāyāna doctrine hardly deserves the name of a faith. If we may judge from the forms which Buddhism has assumed, there are two well-marked series of phenomena in changes of faith. On the one hand, belief progresses from Fetichism through anthropomorphic theism up to that purest of all kinds of theism which is preached by Mr. Herbert Spencer—the belief in a something, or, as the Buddhists of the Mahāyāna school called it, a nothing. On the other hand, there seems to be a retrogressive change from the belief in a nothing to the personification of that nothing which then becomes a something, and so downwards to the grossest forms of anthropomorphic theism.

It will be observed that we have called the Mahāyāna faith at one time atheism, at another theism. The line of demarcation between pure theism and atheism is so faint, that it is difficult to determine where one begins and the other ends. That which is, regarded from one point of view, theism, is, regarded from another point of view, atheism. Mr. Spencer, who insists upon the existence of a something, has been called (unjustly, as it seems to us) an atheist; and one section of the Mahāyāna school starting from a belief in nothingness absolute arrived at a *personification* of nothingness. And this necessity for regarding nothingness as a something seems to have been, from the first, inherent in the Mahāyāna doctrine; “emptiness,” they held, “is the abstract essence, existing in everything without causal connexion, and comprising all though containing nothing. . . . voidness is alone self-existent and perfect;” whence it appears that nothingness soon became invested with attributes—became, in short, a something.

The truth seems to be that, as men advance in intellect, they successively abstract something from the doctrines of their predecessors. Their philosophy takes at last the form of scepticism, of atheism, or of pure theism; of scepticism when they do not dogmatise, of atheism or pure theism when they do. But, inasmuch as the whole human race has not yet attained a high degree of philosophical acu-

men, the views of the philosopher are either not accepted, or, if accepted, undergo a kind of metempsychosis; they serve but to vivify less intellectual forms of faith, just as the Pythagoreans believed that the souls of men entered the bodies of dogs and swine. Let us, however, hope that mankind has already advanced so far as to have established a school of philosophy within which the esoteric doctrines of thinking men will always obtain a hearing, and be understood.

It will without doubt be thought strange that we have in this review associated Mr. Herbert Spencer with Dr. Doherty—still more strange that we have associated him with Zadkiel. We, however, mean no disrespect to any one in doing so. We are dealing with a subject which ramifies in widely different directions; and it is by reference to certain astrological doctrines that we can best illustrate a curious and a constantly recurring phase in the history of human thought. We have before us the astrological doctrines taught by the Buddhists, and the astrological doctrines taught by Lilly and Zadkiel; and we regard them as holding a very remarkable intermediate position between science and dogmatism. The phase of thought here illustrated is that in which the mind has arrived at induction, but has stopped short of verification. An induction is made from a small number of instances, and, when made, is accepted as a dogma. Dogmas, as we have already remarked, are prolific; and there is a deadly struggle for existence continually going on between young dogmas and old dogmas—between the young dogmas one with another, and the old dogmas one with another; nor is it easy to discover why one survives and another dies. The chances of success seem to be neither increased nor diminished by a quasi-scientific element in any dogma. Dogmas which can trace back their ancestry to some quasi-scientific progenitor frequently hold their own, side by side with dogmas of purely dogmatic blood. Astrology has existed side by side with religion for ages, sometimes gaining a little ground, sometimes losing a little. But, although it may not destroy vitality, a scientific or even a quasi-scientific element in any dogma seems to have the effect of lessening its power of diffusion. No scientific or quasi-scientific dogma has ever been so widely diffused as the fundamental dogmas of religion. By the side of religion, even astrology, with all its attractions, has been but a dwarf.

But let us examine more closely the position which astrology holds in the history of science and philosophy. This, the most poetical, the most beautiful of all superstitions, is perhaps of all the most rational. It is a superstition which in the infancy of science was inevitable; it is probably almost cœval with human thought; it must have sprung into existence with human institutions. The changes of

the seasons must of necessity have associated themselves with changes in the position of the sun, with changes in the relative length of night and day. It is perhaps difficult for us to realise to ourselves with what eagerness our primitive ancestors must have watched for every sign of spring, with what anxiety they must have striven, the long winter through, to propitiate the God of Heat. To him, without doubt, were attributed the first shootings of the grain from its seed, the greenness of the pastures, the blossoms of the fruit-trees, even the fertility of the cattle. To him, probably, thanks were offered for the garnered harvest, for the fruits that cooled the parched lips of the sweating reaper.

But, though the changes in the sun's position might be observed without taking note of the other heavenly bodies, those other bodies could not fail to attract the attention of an observant savage. His first discovery would probably be that the sun, observed from a given point at different times, rose and set in different places relatively to another given point on the earth. But he could not fail to observe, also, that the heavenly bodies which were last visible before sunrise, or first visible after sunset, differed also in their positions, and that some ceased altogether to be visible. He would thus arrive at the perception of certain relations between the sun and other heavenly bodies. With the existence of some of those relations, he would associate certain mundane conditions; with the existence of other relations, other mundane conditions. Then comes the astrological induction: certain mundane conditions may be inferred from the relative position of certain heavenly bodies; therefore all mundane conditions may be inferred from the relative position of the heavenly bodies. Many a sound scientific generalisation has been made in a precisely similar manner; but the soundness has been established by verification, which in the case of astrology is wanting. And yet not wholly wanting, even in astrology; the discovery of the influence of the moon upon the tides, and the necessity of computing time by the positions of the heavenly bodies, have doubtless had their effect in carrying down the study of astrology to the nineteenth century.

There is always a want of plasticity in every hypothesis; and the earlier the stage of the science, the greater the want of plasticity. When any scientific hypothesis assumes its most rigid form, it is not to be distinguished from a dogma. Even facts may become distorted to suit the hypothesis, while the hypothesis refuses to alter its form in order to suit the facts. This is what has happened in astrology; it is what happens occasionally in various branches of science, even in our own day. We frequently hear the law of gravitation spoken of, not as a high generalisation, not as an excellent explanation and

classification of facts, but as absolutely, positively, finally true. We frequently hear the existence of atoms treated not as a convenient hypothesis, which affords one possible explanation of chemical phenomena, but as a fact which it is heresy to question. So astrology assumed that all terrestrial affairs were regulated by the position of the heavenly bodies, and continued to insist upon that hypothesis, even when it no longer explained facts. It is for this reason that astrology is now held in contempt;—not because there is any *a priori* improbability in the assumption upon which it is based, but because the hypothesis has failed to adapt itself to existing circumstances, because the rigidity of ancient hypotheses appears ludicrous when placed side by side with the still rigid, but comparatively plastic, hypotheses of modern times.

Interesting though the subject is, it is not our province to enter into the details of astrology at length. But there is, if we are not mistaken, a psychological lesson to be learned even from astrology. The Buddhist astrology seems hardly to deserve the name; it is a frivolous attempt to predict the future, with which attempt the stars have little or nothing to do. The English book, on the contrary, is a systematic and elaborate treatise, and is strictly and purely astrological. It is not without wonder that we find men, evidently of some ability, devoting their lives to such a pursuit; the fascination must to some minds be irresistible, and disappointment cannot affect it. We have had the curiosity to test some of the statements contained in the book; they are simply false; and their falsity is intensely ludicrous. Many of those who read these words will be disposed to exclaim “of course,” and to smile at the simplicity of any one who could take the trouble to ascertain the fact. But to say “of course” is to dogmatise, to reject a statement in behalf of which an appeal is made to evidence without examining the evidence appealed to.

The following passage in Zadkiel's preface is a perfectly fair challenge to every anthropologist, to every man of science:

“If a proposition of *any nature* be made to any individual, about the result of which he is anxious, and therefore uncertain, whether to accede to it or not, let him but note the hour and minute when it was *first* made, and erect a figure of the heavens, as herein taught, and his doubts will be instantly resolved. He may thus, in five minutes, learn infallibly whether the affair will succeed or not. If he examine the sign on the first house of the figure, the planet therein, or the planet ruling the sign, *will exactly describe the party making the offer*, both in person and character; and this may at once convince the inquirer for truth of the reality of the principles of the science. Moreover, the descending sign, etc., *will describe his own person and character*; a farther proof of the truth of the science, if he require it.

Here, then, is a ready test of the truth of astrology. Will its adversaries dare to make its application?"

We have had the necessary amount of audacity, and have found ourselves described sometimes as fair, sometimes as dark, sometimes as tall, sometimes as short, sometimes as jovial, sometimes as saturnine, sometimes as handsome, sometimes as ugly, sometimes as idiotic, sometimes as possessing genius, sometimes as extremely moral, sometimes as extremely immoral, sometimes as possessing all or nearly all the above attributes at the same time. We have at different times had moles scattered over every part of our person to such an extent that the moly surface has left scarcely any space for the non-moly surface. Our friends have fared no better than ourselves. We can readily allow for differences of opinion on the question of moral or mental qualifications; but we really cannot see that the stars have any right to call a red-haired man black-haired, or a black-haired man fair-haired, or to call a man with yellow hair at one time black-haired, at another red-haired.

So much for the truth of astrology; now for the lesson. It is not to be supposed that any man would make such an appeal as that above quoted, unless he believed in his own doctrines. He would not otherwise rashly put the means of refutation into the hands of the public. He must have gone on believing, for years, against the evidence of his senses. Marvellous, indeed, is the force of prejudice; but though prejudice is always unscientific, it is often perfectly conscientious. No moral excellence, perhaps even no intellectual excellence, is a guarantee against prejudice—against unconscious dogmatism: but there are degrees in prejudice as in moral and mental excellence; and although we cannot say with certainty that prejudice varies inversely with either mental or moral excellence, the statement that prejudice varies inversely with mental excellence is probably a very near approximation to the truth. But as no one can point to an absolutely perfect intellect, so no one can point to an intellect perfectly free from prejudice,—to an intellect which never dogmatises,—which never assumes what it has no right to assume.

And so it happens that in philosophy and in science there are grades. It is difficult to decide where philosophy ends and pseudo-philosophy begins. In all philosophy there seems to be a greater or less admixture of pseudo-philosophy—in all pseudo-philosophy there seems to be a greater or less admixture of philosophy. For example, even Mr. Herbert Spencer, whose method is rigorously philosophical, has, as we believe we have shown, fallen unconsciously into the pseudo-philosophical doctrine that general terms are something more

than general terms. Dr. Doherty, who is at the other end of the scale, recognises the true philosophical method, though he does not practise it. Dr. Doherty's mind appears to have received no more than a scratch or two from the scientific ideas of our time, while Mr. Herbert Spencer's mind has been penetrated through and through. The result is that Mr. Herbert Spencer makes what we believe to be one or two mistakes, while Dr. Doherty writes a book which is a series of mistakes from beginning to end. Dr. Doherty and Zadkiel both recognise verbally the fact that there are laws in nature; one marked difference between them and Mr. Spencer is that he knows what a law is and they do not. Zadkiel seems to have no idea that he who would establish a law must at least leave no obvious facts unexplained which contradict that supposed law. He argues that if a prediction is fulfilled *sometimes* the truth of the principles upon which it was made has been demonstrated. Dr. Doherty, misled throughout by words, looks upon a natural law as one of nature's acts of parliament; any one, he supposes, is at liberty to act in opposition to it, but must be prepared to take the consequences. "Is it not evident," he says, "that suffering must be caused by this process of purification from rebellious wilfulness against the immutable laws of spiritual life and health?" And again: "We obey the law of gravitation and physical dependency with joy." Dr. Doherty seems to have not the slightest suspicion that we obey the law of gravitation because we have no choice about the matter; it never seems to have occurred to him that the man who lies crushed and mangled at the foot of a badly built scaffold has obeyed the law of gravitation with anything rather than joy.

Mr. Spencer, it is hardly necessary to say, is a man of a totally different stamp. He has done very good service to the cause of science, and in his *Principles of Psychology* he almost anticipated the famous generalisation of Mr. Darwin. It is only the existence of that portion of Mr. Spencer's work in which he treats of "The Unknowable" that has enabled us, for the moment, to compare him with others who have professed to know still more about the unknowable.

But it is the lot of all men to make mistakes. Striving as we all are to find our way in the dark, it is no matter for wonder if we sometimes go out of our way, if we sometimes knock ourselves against an impenetrable wall. And it is the duty especially of us as anthropologists, to be charitable towards all who show an earnest desire to arrive at the truth, who make no attempt to dictate. The younger the science, the greater the chances of error; and we therefore should be especially careful how we throw stones. But Mr. Spencer has

somewhere remarked that no one can afford to dispense with the criticisms of his contemporaries. No remark can be truer; and no one can less afford to dispense with such criticisms than the anthropologist. Let us then all work harmoniously together; let each of us be ready to admit his individual fallibility; let each of us take in good part the suggestions of those who see cause to differ from us; so, by unity of action, by mutual corrections of extreme doctrines, may we hope to arrive at the truth. Above all, let us be on our guard against dogmatism, at whatever point it may appear; let us take for our motto the words of St. Paul, "PROVE all things; hold fast that which is good."

DIEFENBACH'S INTRODUCTION TO ETHNOGRAPHY AND THE HISTORY OF CIVILISATION.*

OUR limits prevent us from giving anything like a detailed account of the multifarious contents of this production; we must, therefore, content ourselves by giving a very brief outline of its scope. The work essentially consists of two parts. The first part treats of diversities of race; the second part, constituting by far the greater portion of the volume, is devoted to the history of civilisation.

After a brief introduction, in which the author gives an account of the principles from which he starts, we have an interesting chapter on names and language in general. Under the heading physiology, we are presented with a survey of the leading theories concerning the physical character of the various types of humanity, their origin, and the relations to each other. The influence of climate, soil, etc.

Dr. Diefenbach enjoys in Germany a deservedly high reputation as a philologist, litterateur, and promoter of public education; but he is not a naturalist. We, therefore, did not expect to find anything new in the ethnographical section on the types of mankind, which chiefly concerns us here. Such of our readers as have perused Mr. Collingwood's excellent edition of Waitz's *Anthropology*, which is constantly

* "Vorschule der Völkerkunde und der Bildungsgeschichte" von Dr. Lorenz Diefenbach, Corresponding Member of the Royal Academy of Science of Berlin, etc. Frankfurt: 1864. (Pp. 746.)